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2 Introduction 
The currency controversy about the Chinese Renminbi (RMB) has been a popular topic in the 
media in the last years (Factiva, 2005-2010), and even though at first sight this is an economic 
disagreement, the currency dispute and China’s reluctance to give in to demands for appreciation 
have to be considered in the broader context of the foreign relations of China and its trading partners. 
Against the background of China’s economic and political rise to great power status, the question 
of the appropriate value of the RMB became central to Western and Chinese policymakers, scholars 
and journalists. The criticism on the level of the RMB focusses on accusations of currency 
manipulation; more specifically, it was suggested that China used an undervalued RMB to promote 
exports, thereby contributing to an unequal global trade balance.  
However, as the literature review shows, the academic debate over the value of the RMB is neither 
impartial nor comprehensive. The current literature leaves many questions open, simplifies matters, 
is not value-free and, above all, disregards how comprehensive the decision-making process in 
China is. The major point of criticism in this paper is the treatment of China as a coherent unit that 
can freely decide and implement any decisions. Such an elitist understanding is not sufficient to 
analyse China’s foreign policy making. The purpose of this paper is therefore to show that the 
establishment of the value of the RMB is more complex than portrayed by the West. It will analyse 
the actors constituting the Chinese foreign exchange rate policy, arguing that business actors 
became increasingly relevant between 2005 and 2008. 
This paper consists of three main sections, the first section shedding light onto both background 
and relevant literature. The second section consists of two chapters on the official decision-making 
process as well as the impact of business actors on the exchange rate policy in 2008. Finally, in the 
last section, a conclusion will be provided.  
3 Background and Literature Review 
Since China devalued the RMB in 1994, the question of the appropriate value of the currency has 
been present in media, academia and politics. When China became a member of the WTO in 2001 
and when China’s exports surged at the expense of its imports, creating a trade surplus, the 
international community started to look increasingly critical on the value of the RMB and its role 
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in promoting Chinese exports. Many academic articles focus on the appropriate level of the RMB, 
the legal dimension or on offering policy suggestions for China and the US.  
In 2005, the People’s Republic of China announced a major shift in the country’s exchange rate 
system, from a fixed exchange rate pegged to the dollar to a managed float regime with reference 
to a basket consisting of 11 currencies. The RMB was allowed to float under a band of originally 
0.3% daily (Mercurio & Leung, 2009, p. 1261). Whereas a change in this band was usually 
announced on the internet page of the People’s Bank of China (PBC), the weights of the respective 
currencies have never been published and are subject to fluctuation and most likely manipulation 
(Frankel, 2010, p. 52).  
Between 2005 and 2013, the RMB appreciated by nearly 23%. As figure 1 in the appendix shows, 
between 2005 and 2008, the RMB rapidly appreciated by 15%, until the speed of appreciation 
slowed down after 2008 again. Between 2008 and 2010, the RMB appreciated by less than 3%. 
Between 2010 and 2012, the rate of RMB appreciation increased again and overall appreciated by 
7%. Hence, there has been a significant pause of RMB appreciation between 2008 and 2010. 
While 23% of appreciation could be considered a substantial appreciation, the mainstream 
literature on the RMB value does not come to this conclusion. As the following literature review 
will establish, the undervaluation of the RMB is a hotly debated topic and dominated by biased 
academics pursuing specific objectives.  
 
The current literature on the RMB can be roughly divided into two categories, the first focusing on 
the RMB directly and the second focusing more broadly on decision-making within China. While 
literature particularly focusing on the RMB is mostly biased, a broader analysis of the decision-
making in China has not yet analysed the emergence of business actors in the establishment of 
foreign economic policy. 
Simply put, the currency dispute has two camps that either attack the level of the RMB or defend 
it. The majority of criticism on the Chinese currency policy argues that China manipulates the 
currency in order to support its exporters, making Chinese exports competitively cheap, increasing 
the trade disequilibrium with the US and thereby unemployment in the US. Most of these accounts 
suggest to respond to China’s manipulation with sanctions or official appeals under China’s 
obligations of the WTO or IMF (Bergsten, 2010; Eichengreen, 2004; Goldstein & Lardy, 2006; 
Goodfried & Prasad, 2008). However, neither is likely to be successful, as Mercurio and Leung 
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(2009) analyse. Furthermore, there is considerable disagreement on the level of undervaluation, the 
relation between exchange rates and trade disequilibrium or unemployment (Bowles & Wang, 
2006).  
The most striking problem with the current research on China’s currency policy is however that 
neither camp pays much attention to the domestic situation of monetary policies. The authors 
arguing against China’s currency policy fail to take into account that there is not “a” China that has 
“one” interest. They argue that they know what is best for China and that they know what is in the 
interest of the leaders and which objectives these leaders follow. Thus, when Goodfried and Prasad 
(2008, p. 84) state that “China has a better reason to adopt a more flexible exchange rate: It would 
be good for China”, they deprive Chinese actors from making their own judgment as well as their 
own sovereign economic decision. Similarly, Bergsten’s (2010, p. 11) observation that 
“appreciation of the renminbi at this time would in fact serve both the internal and external policy 
objectives of the Chinese authorities” assumes a deep knowledge of both the Chinese market as 
well as the objectives of the Chinese authorities. Especially the latter is highly questionable, 
because this group of scholars does not question their own assumption of what the Chinese 
leadership deems a relevant objective, as Eichengreen (2004, p. 2)  illustrates as well: “There is no 
question that eventually China will want a more flexible exchange rate.” 
The reasons for these authors to simplify the complex Chinese situation and treat China as a unitary 
actor are diverse. Robert Cox’s (1981) observation that “theory is always for someone and some 
purpose” gives the most crucial reason why these scholars’ accounts are biased. Authors like 
Bergsten want to convince US policy makers to take action in order to enhance the US economic 
position on the global market. They tend to selectively read and interpret economic facts in a 
fashion beneficial to their agenda, in order to convince scholars and the general public that China’s 
currency manipulation is inequitable; that China is not playing by the rules of the international 
order. Such a position however translates into a superficial and inadequate depiction of the Chinese 
reality. Coupled with a general distrust of a non-democratic regime, they reproduce a binary view 
of the West against China, which is a common problem with US literature on China. Furthermore, 
mainly (US-) economists with no specific education on China or knowledge of the language write 
on the RMB issue. Without Chinese language skills, it is very difficult to conduct comprehensive 
research. Their research tends to be informed by observable statistics and calculations and follows 
positivist approaches. Due to the fact that the Chinese domestic situation is complex, difficult to 
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take into account or even to comprehend, they disregard it in their research and focus only on 
observable factors, overall treating China as a unitary actor. One problem directly resulting from 
these simplistic assumptions of the Chinese domestic situation is the fact that the large number of 
US firms producing in China is mostly ignored. These firms share similar advantages and 
disadvantages from monetary policy as domestic firms: Both types profit from a competitively low 
exchange rate, and any increase in the value of the RMB might result in export-related difficulties, 
for which US authors seldom account. Moreover, authors like Bergsten (2010) also treat the US 
domestic situation as clearly observable and unitary. However, Yang, Yin, and He (2007, p. 128) 
illustrate that US multinational enterprises (MNEs) and US small and medium enterprises (SMEs) 
actually have different opinions on the currency issues, depending on whether or not they export 
from China. The most dominant criticism on the value of the RMB is hence very short-sighted and 
overly simplistic. This research will not delve deeper into either the US domestic situation or the 
situation of MNEs in China, but rather highlight how diverse the domestic decision-making 
dimension of monetary policy in China is.  
 
In contrast to these critical authors, scholars arguing in favour of the Chinese exchange rate policy 
may show a better understanding of China’s domestic situation, but their research also lacks 
comprehensiveness. First of all, their research is often on the defensive side and directed against 
(US-) criticism. The position of the US as the provider of the reserve currency and the power that 
comes along with it to force the burden of adjustment on other countries is for instance central to 
the analysis of Bowles and Wang (2006). Furthermore, authors dismiss the accusation that China 
is responsible for the domestic economic problems of the US, such as unemployment and fiscal 
deficits, since it would be “against common sense” (Huang, 2010, p. 23). Moreover, authors like 
Ha (2006) argue that the pressure of the US for China’s currency appreciation is in essence caused 
by its determination to maintain its superpower status. Additionally, apart from a few exceptions, 
authors arguing in favour of the RMB level resemble the first group of scholars in that they treat 
China and its interests as unitary, obvious and observable, and rely heavily on the analysis of 
economic data. For instance, the article of Shen (2005) uses economic analysis to prove that the 
RMB exchange rate and the trade imbalance are not related. The articles by Ha (2006) and Zhao 
(2010) exemplify as well that a critical distance to the topic is not provided, since they repeatedly 
refer to “our country” when referring to China. Furthermore, they also tend to assume to know for 
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which reasons monetary policy is implemented. Zhao (2010) states that the exchange rate 
mechanism is supposed to address the problems of development and economic growth, but as the 
governor of the PBC, Zhao Xiaochuan, who is actually involved in the decision-making process, 
states, “monetary policy is not supposed to cure problems“(China Industrial News Information 
Centre, 2008). Zhao’s (2010) assumptions are hence simplifying the background and objectives of 
monetary policy as well, treating the objectives of the central leadership as clearly observable and 
unitary.  
Hence, whether those economists are against or in favour of China’s exchange rate policy, the 
debate is politicized and not objective. In the end, both sides writing on the RMB exchange rate 
treat China as a unitary actor that can easily implement any decision it deems important, without 
inner struggles or bargaining involved. This research questions this conceptualization of China and 
illustrates that China is not a unitary actor.  
 
Chinese area specialists have in the last year paid increased attention to China’s foreign policy and 
its formulation (Johnston & Ross, 2006; Lampton, 2001; Lanteigne, 2009; Rozman, 2013; Zeng, 
2009). These works usually concentrate on the evolution of foreign policy in the course of the 
reform era, for instance the professionalization of politics in China or the change from personalized 
leadership under Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping to a more technocratic leadership by Jiang 
Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping. Unlike the scholars who discuss the RMB’s value, most of these 
accounts do not treat China as a coherent unit.  
However, due to the difficulty of studying a non-transparent regime, they mostly concentrate on 
the interests of core ministries and seldom look at the impact of business representatives on 
economic decision-making. One of the most comprehensive accounts on foreign policy decision-
making, Lu (2000, p. 4), deliberately disregards economic decision-making because it is “such a 
complex and dynamic area of inquiry [...] that it is necessary to deal with the subject in a separate 
study.“ One useful account that sheds light onto the “process of decision-making behind China’s 
bilateral and multilateral trade disputes” is Zeng (2009, p. 2). This book and the case studies 
advanced in the chapters incorporate an analysis of the rise of protectionist forces and their impact 
on the formulation of foreign policy. The RMB dispute is not treated in detail, but the book finds 
that protectionist voices become more vocal and contribute to decision-making through policy 
suggestions and policy alternatives, but overall remain fragile because they are not institutionalized 
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(Zeng, 2009, p. 11). Similarly, Jiang’s (2010) research on the decision-making process in China’s 
advancement of Free Trade Agreements argues that China is not a coherent unit and that 
protectionist forces and liberalizing forces are bargaining and balancing each other in the decision-
making process. Moreover, authors like Dickson (2007) analyse the emergence of the private sector 
in China and discuss whether the private sector might be a driver of democratization of the political 
system. Since the party is co-opting the private sector into the existing authoritarian system, 
creating “red capitalists”, it has led some authors to conclude that the government has a “contract” 
with its citizens that will support the government as long as growth, stability and security is 
provided (Breslin, 2010, p. 202). However, what impact this position of the private business sector 
has on China’s foreign policy has seldom been researched in greater detail or disregarded as being 
too limited. For instance, Pearson (2001, p. 352) contends that “no evidence [could be found] that 
private interests, including private business, labour groups, or consumers acting independent of the 
government, weighed in on the WTO issue in China.” Similarly, Jiang (2010: 242) believes that 
even though the business sector becomes more vocal, it is not yet independent enough to have a 
real impact on the decision-making, because no independent labour union acts on its behalf.  
 
There is one work that stands out in its attempt to provide a comprehensive account of the making 
of the exchange rate, namely Liew and Wu (2007). Most other literature which analyses the 
decision-making process of the exchange rate is either produced by the same authors or closely 
based upon their novel research (Liew, 2010; Yi, 2011). The book by Liew and Wu analyses the 
most relevant aspects of the exchange rate policy from planned economy until the adoption of a 
managed float in 2005, with a strong emphasis on governmental bodies and leadership backgrounds 
/ preferences. Their research is valuable because it provides a good framework for conducting an 
analysis of exchange rate policy-making and offers deep insights into the official decision-making 
process. Even though it is pioneering, there remain two crucial problems.  
First, Liew and Wu’s (2007) understanding of power distribution and its analysis is too closely 
linked to observable effects and specific events, at the expense of attributing any influence of non-
ministerial bodies to China’s foreign policy. Different bodies are attributed different interests, 
based upon the structure and responsibilities they hold. Restructuring of ministries, as happened 
with the Ministry of Foreign Commerce in 2003 (MOFCOM) are interpreted as a change of their 
interests and respective powers (Liew & Wu, 2007, p. 202). The background of politicians involved 
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in the decision-making process is taken as an indicator for their interests. However, such a 
behavioural focus on observable factors with subjective interests seen as policy preferences which 
are eventually revealed through political participation is not comprehensive enough, because 
important factors outside of the inner circles of politics cannot be incorporated into the analysis.  
Second, Liew and Wu state that “the final decision [of the exchange rate] is definitive and does not 
offer ground for bargaining through implementation” (Liew & Wu, 2007, p. 145). This exclusion 
of those who are not part of the official decision-making process means that Liew and Wu cannot 
trace how and under which circumstances non-traditional actors such as business representatives 
might gain power. It will become evident in the course of this research that it is precisely in the 
policy implementation that new domestic actors find room for influencing government decisions.  
 
As this literature review established, the current literature on the RMB, China’s foreign policy as 
well as the making of the exchange rate policy does not satisfy the needs of a comprehensive 
account on the decision-making process of economic issues such as the value of the RMB.  
To fill the gap in the current literature, this research will show that China is, contrary to the common 
assumption, not a coherent unit implementing decisions. The time period on which the paper 
focuses is from 2005-2008. Frankel (2010, p. 53) states that by mid-2008, the currency basket 
returned to weighing the US-Dollar more than other currencies. The visible pause in the 
appreciation of the RMB by 2008 suggests that the government had interfered in the middle of 
2008. This paper will argue that this is most likely the result of increased power of business 
representatives. More precisely, it will provide evidence for the likelihood that business 
representatives caused the government to stop the speed of RMB appreciation in 2008. In order to 
illustrate how this independent variable can be linked to the dependent variable, it will employ 
process tracing as a method. Process tracing is ideal because it identifies a causal chain that links 
independent and dependent variable (Checkel, 2008, p. 114) and divides the process “into smaller 
steps” so that “observable evidence for each step” (van Evera, 1997, p. 64) in the end leads to a 
plausible explanation of an outcome.  
However, good process-tracing needs to also “consider the possibility of alternative processes that 
lead to the outcome in question” (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 290). This research will therefore 
discuss the role of the global financial crisis in 2008 as well, in order to check whether the pause 
in RMB appreciation can be solely explained by the severity of the crisis.  
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Even though process-tracing is the best method to object to the common western assumption of a 
unitary actor China, the current research is limited in that it provides suggestive evidence rather 
than hard facts for the influence of business representatives on the decision-making process. In 
order to develop this research further, interviews with top officials, business representatives and 
other officials would be necessary. However, because of time constraints, monetary constraints, 
language barriers and above all the unlikelihood that top officials would speak openly, this research 
can only compile suggestive evidence for the impact of business representatives. The final proof 
that business representative have a direct impact on the leadership will remain open for future 
research. Nonetheless, the revelations this research can uncover are worthwhile in themselves 
because they provide a more comprehensive understanding of Chinese politics than the majority of 
the literature does. As Trachtenberg (2006, p. 35) correctly notes: “Understanding […] emerges as 
the central goal in its own right—as the end in itself, not as the means for getting at the mysterious 
and ultimately unreachable goal of the ‘truth.’”  
 
The next chapters will look more closely at the intermediate steps between business leaders and 
the outcome of a pause in RMB appreciation and identify the conditions under which it has been 
possible for business representatives to affect the outcome of foreign economic policy. The sources 
the paper will access include secondary sources, but mainly reports by the involved entities, such 
as the PBC or the MOFCOM, but also documents retrieved from the “Factiva” database that 
allowed a detailed research of the media in China. This proved to be very helpful since Factiva 
allows to modify the search in great detail and offers access to many Chinese-language news 
agency reports and newspapers in which statements by governmental representatives are depicted.  
4 The Role of Business Actors in the Exchange Rate Policy 
When this paper talks about business actors, representatives or export-oriented companies, it 
mostly refers to SMEs. According to The International Business Newspaper (2008), the role of 
SMEs in China is increasingly important, since “SMEs account for 99.8% of the total number of 
enterprises, and more than 95% of the private sector enterprises are SMEs.” Furthermore, according 
to Zhao (2010), SMEs account for 68% of total export. Hence, SMEs are mostly private, numerous 
and export-oriented.  
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4.1 The Official Decision-Making Process 
In order to look at the particular decision-making process in 2008, this section provides an overview 
of the formal process and the institutions that are involved. 
The final decision in economic decision-making lies with the Politburo, more precisely with the 
members of the Politburo Standing Committee. While it is true that in the 2000s, a pluralization of 
decision-making has occurred and more actors and ministries became involved (Jakobson & Knox, 
2010), the weight of particular politicians can still hinder or advance certain policies. For instance, 
according to Pearson (2001, p. 338), “China’s top leaders inserted themselves into the GATT/WTO 
admission process at decisive times and in ways that trumped the rest of the process.” Similarly, 
Jiang (2010, p. 243) argues that Zhu Rongji’s initiative for conducting free trade negotiations with 
ASEAN assured that the project advanced against domestic protectionist forces. Since the 
exchange rate policy has been at the centre of trade disputes with the US and other countries, 
decisions about the foreign exchange regime have a significant impact on China’s diplomatic 
relations. As a result, China’s top leaders naturally take a great interest and can in theory exert 
considerable personal influence on the outcome of exchange rate related decisions.  
However, since there are only a few members of the Standing Committee, they cannot take control 
of the whole process, in particular not if bargaining and consensus building between different 
ministries is involved and required. This mediation and information collection role is attributed to 
leading small groups (LSGs) that are below the Politburo and the State Council (Liang, 2009, p. 24). 
They are the primary organ to coordinate information and policy recommendations of several other 
agencies; they hence keep the many loose threads in their hand and make the final decision. Leading 
members of the Politburo are usually in charge of these LSGs. In the case of the exchange rate 
policy, according to both Yi (2011) and Liew and Wu (2007), it is the Central Leading Group on 
Finance and Economics (CLGFE) that is the major organ to decide foreign exchange rate policy. 
Information on the CLGFE is very difficult to acquire because the CLGFE does not have an official 
webpage or list of members. This means that research on membership is mainly based on internet 
sources. According to Baidu (2014)1, the actors that are represented in the CLGFE are the vice-
premiers, the director of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the minister 
of finance and the central bank governor. There is however no information given anywhere whether 
                                                          
1 Baidu (2014) was recently updated. Since it is no academic source, the retrieved information is not fully reliable. 
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the MOFCOM is represented in the CLGFE. That leading small groups are rather secretive in 
character and not transparent is well illustrated in the CLGFE. Even though the CLGFE employs, 
according to Liew and Wu (2007, p. 148), an office and a research office, it is not possible to locate 
or access their research papers. It is however possible to screen the media for information on what 
members of the CLGFE say and what their opinion on specific issues is. 
If the CLGFE is responsible for making the final decision, it is the PBC which has to implement 
the policy. Yi (2011) and Liew and Wu (2007) repeatedly state that the PBC’s main concern is to 
control domestic inflation and to remain sovereign in its monetary policy. According to Yi (2011, 
p. 175), the PBC has gained more bargaining power in the Hu-Wen administration and, because it 
has many affiliated research offices, acts as both policy advisor and decision-maker. Especially the 
dominant governor, Zhou Xiaochuan, figures prominently in media and research papers on the 
RMB more generally, also in English-language literature.  
The MOFCOM on the other hand is the one ministry which does not appear to have a representative 
in the CLGFE, but a strong interest in the exchange rate policy. According to Liew and Wu (2007, 
p. 202), the MOFCOM does not play a great role in the currency process because it is a merger of 
the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC), the former Ministry of 
Commerce as well as elements of the State Economic and Trade Commission. The former 
MOFTEC had a great stake in the decision-making process and came closest to representing the 
export-industries, but since many new obligations were added in the course of the restructuring, 
Liew and Wu (2007:208) consider the influence of the MOFCOM to have decreased. Pearson 
(2010, p. 626) on the other hand sees the emergence of the MOFCOM as proof of the fine-tuning 
and pluralization of decision-making, since the bargaining and compromising within the 
MOFCOM before it voices its viewpoint must be quite comprehensive given its various 
departments. However, Pearson also states that the power of the MOFCOM has decreased vis-à-
vis the emergence of the NDRC (Pearson, 2010, p. 627). Yi (2010: 171) on the other hand believes 
that the MOFCOM is a significant actor in the decision-making process and still mainly represents 
the interests of exporting companies. As can be seen, there is considerable disagreement about the 
role of the MOFCOM in the exchange-rate decision-making process. However, since the 
MOFCOM is the only ministry that has a stake in the currency rate but is not represented in the 
CLGFE, it seems likely that its possible influence is indeed not as great in contrast to other actors 
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involved in the official decision-making process. Hence, business representatives cannot fully rely 
on lobbying efforts of the MOFCOM.   
 
When it was decided in 2005 to discontinue the dollar-peg, the decision was according to Yi (2011, 
p. 175) and Liew and Wu (2007, p. 209) the result of bargaining and consensus-building of the 
NDRC, the PBC and the MOFCOM. The decision to implement a currency basket under a trading 
band represented the overall shift of the economy away from “export- towards domestic demand-
driven economic growth” (Liew & Wu, 2007, p. 209). The fact that the RMB was not allowed to 
freely float but rather fluctuate within a trading band is seen by both accounts as sign that the 
MOFCOM (Yi, 2011, p. 172) as well as the NDRC (Liew & Wu, 2007, p. 201) compromised with 
the PBC which preferred appreciation in order to keep inflation under control. Furthermore, in 
order to provide answers on the RMB exchange rate policy, the PBC offers a frequently-asked-
questions catalogue on their webpage that includes explanations such as the timing to reform the 
exchange rate regime or the relation of RMB reform and exporting companies. Moreover, it is 
emphasized that the decision to establish a new currency regime required more than a year of 
careful consideration and was not a response to external (hence US-) pressure (People's Bank of 
China, 2008a). As Breslin (2010, p. 203) explains, the leadership has repeatedly been criticized for 
not being “forceful enough when it comes to promoting and defending China's interests”. The 
leading elite is hence under pressure, and any appearance of yielding to US-demands for 
appreciation could discredit their overall legitimization. Because of the politicized character of the 
RMB exchange rate reform, it is thus important that the leadership emphasizes its independence in 
monetary policy making, which is reflected in the provision of information about the decision as 
well as the emphasis on non-interference from foreign actors. In the end, the CLGFE’s decision 
over the exchange rate represents the different power distributions among those concerned and the 
consensus-building efforts that the new monetary policy in 2005 required. Eventually, the adoption 
of the currency basket in 2005 illustrates well that China is not acting as a unitary actor like the 
majority of literature on the RMB suggests. 
The decision to de-peg the RMB in 2005 and allow its appreciation disadvantaged export-oriented 
companies significantly because they could no longer rely on a competitive exchange rate. 
However, these companies seem not to have had any real impact on the final decision in 2005 since 
the new exchange rate policy was adopted and not counterbalanced by other export-supporting 
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subsidies. Instead, export tax rebates had even be lowered for industries that required much energy, 
only produced low-value products and were polluting, in an effort to upgrade China’s composition 
of export (Chen, 2011).  
 
4.2 Business Actors and the Exchange Rate Policy in 2008 
One of Liew and Wu’s (2007, p. 145) major propositions is that in the establishment of the Chinese 
exchange rate, there is no room for post-decision bargaining, that only policy inputs, the processing 
and preliminary evaluation of alternative policies leading towards a major decision would matter. 
However, when analysing how the decision to pause the speed of appreciation in the middle of 
2008 came into being, significant post-decision bargaining had occurred. Rather than introducing 
a new foreign exchange mechanism, a substantial pause of RMB appreciation had happened, which 
was most likely the result of successful post-decision bargaining over the value of the RMB. What 
had happened in between? How did this bargaining occur, and how can it be illustrated that it was 
most likely the private sector that influenced the decision of the CLGFE to pause the appreciation 
of the RMB?  
The exact period to look at ranges from July 3, 2008 to July 25, 2008 (Naughton, 2008, p. 8). In 
this period, the central authorities undertook several trips to different provinces, conducted research, 
met and discussed to finally devise a new policy package. These meetings in the middle of 2008 
had to reach a decision on how to respond to the global financial crisis, whether to stick to tight 
macroeconomic policies or to consider a relaxation (China News Service Hong Kong, 2008a). 
Eventually, the latter was decided, which included a substantial break in RMB appreciation, 
loosening of monetary policy and an increase of tax rebates for clothing and textile exports 
(Naughton, 2008). These measures were in sharp contrast to the monetary approach of the 
preceding years. First of all, since 2005, the RMB had considerably and gradually appreciated, 
whereas monetary policy had been increasingly tight in order to combat inflation, as Zhou 
Xiaochuan, the PBC governor stated a few months earlier (China Industrial News Information 
Centre, 2008). Moreover, the tax rebate system had in the previous years also been substantially 
reformed in order to transform the composition of exports towards more value-added products 
(Chen, 2011). Hence, the decision in August 2008 to increase the tax rebates for spinning and 
weaving companies, from 11% to 13% for the first time in three years (Ministry of Commerce, 
2008), was a considerable revision of the original economic strategy as well. As can be seen, not 
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only the decision to pause the appreciation of the RMB but also the general economic strategy was 
amended and revised in the middle of 2008.   
 
4.2.1 The Role of the Global Financial Crisis 2008 for the Decision-Making Process 
As George and Bennett (2005, p. 290) argue, process-tracing also requires the analysis of 
alternative explanations to the outcome under investigation. Before delving deeper into the exact 
decision-making process of July, it is hence reasonable to first consider the role of the global 
financial crisis of 2008 and whether it was the severity of the crisis or export-oriented companies 
that influenced the government to change monetary policy. This is eventually a question of whether 
the financial crisis in itself was severe enough so that the government had no choice than to support 
export-oriented companies or whether one could rather consider it to be a trigger that provided the 
necessary urgency for the companies’ appeals. Furthermore, it is also a question of how active or 
passive export-oriented companies have been involved in the preceding months.  
The financial crisis had, according to a report of the PBC, led to a significant drop of international 
demand, to unemployment and increased downward pressure on the Chinese economy; the 
loosening of monetary policy was hence directed at companies which were in distress (People's 
Bank of China, 2008b). However, this does not mean that only due to the financial crisis export-
oriented companies faced difficulties. Indeed, the director of the office of the CLGFE, Liu He, 
explains that the external danger was the trigger to many internal problems (China News Service 
Hong Kong, 2008c), which suggests that problems already existed before, but did not feature 
prominently. According to Overholt (2013, p. 217), financial distress in the form of rising inflation 
and bankruptcy had preceded the impact of the financial global crisis. The Ministry of Commerce 
(2008) furthermore mentions that already prior to the crisis, the increases in labour wages, tightened 
monetary policy and RMB appreciation made it difficult for spinning and weaving companies to 
produce, calculating that they suffered from a 30% increase in production costs. Moreover, 
according to another report, private companies had much greater problems to access tax rebates 
and were further disadvantaged. Problems hence already existed before the crisis.  
Furthermore, export-oriented companies have not been passively waiting for the government’s 
decision on how to cope with the economic and financial problems. According to The Economic 
Observer (2008), the China Association of Small and Medium enterprises (CASME) had 
repeatedly appealed to various ministries for better access to funding in the preceding months, and 
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Xinhua Agency Service (2008a) remarked in April 2008 that the pressure of the export-oriented 
industry was rapidly growing. 
Moreover, in the middle of 2008, the government had alternatives to a pause in RMB appreciation. 
First of all, it was a fundamental decision between continued tight monetary policy and relaxation. 
Second, the scale of relaxation and support for companies in distress could also be significantly 
varied. For instance, from the measures adopted, it could have been enough to make access to 
credits for SMEs easier and to help them bridge the difficult times through an increase in export 
tax rebates. However, it was decided that a pause in RMB appreciation was also necessary, even 
though these measures contradicted the long-term objectives of preventing the economy from 
overheating that had been the major reason to de-peg the RMB from the US-Dollar in 2005. 
According to Overholt (2013, p. 224), there are several severe problems resulting from the pause 
in RMB appreciation. First of all, keeping the exchange rate stable means that many US dollars 
had to be purchased, which further increased the foreign exchange reserves. Since at one point the 
RMB will need to appreciate, these reserves are prone to be worth less in the future and are hence 
not necessarily the best choice. Furthermore, the pause in RMB appreciation exacerbates inflation 
and cancels the opportunity to use the interest rate to fight it because monetary policy loses its 
independence. Last, the pause makes a change from an export-oriented towards domestic demand-
oriented economy much more difficult. Hence, the CLGFE’s decision to pause the RMB’s 
appreciation results in severe problems as well, and the CLGFE must have been aware of this but 
nonetheless decided to pursue such a change in monetary policy.  
Eventually, the government had to react to the financial crisis, but the manner in which it did 
underlines the relevance of business representatives exerting pressure on them to implement a 
decision that advantages them. If the support to export-oriented companies would have been less 
comprehensive, one might believe that it was solely a governmental decision irrespective of the 
companies’ lobbying. However, the adopted measures were substantial, had severe long-term 
effects and were preceded by a long period of lobbying, which suggests that the influence of export-
oriented companies was relevant in the decision-making process.  
4.2.2 Tracing the Pause in Renminbi Appreciation  
From July 3, 2008 until July 25, 2008, the alteration of monetary policy and pause of the RMB 
appreciation was decided. This period can further be divided into smaller parts. From July 3 to July 
8, prominent members of the top leadership visited several provinces to personally investigate the 
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situation of companies. These top leaders were Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao, Wang Qishan, Xi Jinping 
and Li Keqiang. Both Wen Jiabao and Wang Qishan are important members of the CLGFE. The 
second part of the decision-making process were discussions to hear the opinions from regional 
leaders, economic experts as well as people from the corporate world, lasting from July 8- July 11 
(Xinhua Agency Service, 2008e). The next relevant meetings ranged from July 15 to July 16, and 
were two consecutive half-day executive meetings to discuss the economic situation. Furthermore, 
on July 21, more meetings were held with non-party personages, hence representatives of for 
instance the democratic parties or independent commentators in general. The final meeting was the 
Politburo meeting on July 25. At this meeting, the general direction of macroeconomic policy was 
publicly announced. A stable and rapid economic development should be maintained, while 
controlling for rising prices and inflation, overall strengthening and improving macroeconomic 
control (China News Service Hong Kong, 2008b). Even though this sounds like a continuity of the 
former monetary direction, it is according to Naughton (2008, p. 8) a moderate relaxation of 
monetary policy.  
From these five different steps that led to the relaxation of monetary policy, it is clearly the first 
round in which the impact and influence of business representatives features clearest. Several 
Chinese articles state that the tours of the top leadership to different provinces was unprecedented 
and unexpected (China News Service Hong Kong, 2008a; Hong Kong Economic Times, 2008b). 
Furthermore, these tours were preceded by extensive research since June 13, 2008, in which 
particular attention had been given to the effect of RMB appreciation on companies (China News 
Service Hong Kong, 2008a). Since export-oriented companies struggled, among other things, from 
the fast RMB appreciation, the effect of the fast RMB appreciation was one of the reasons for the 
leadership to personally inspect the economic conditions of companies in several coastal export-
oriented provinces. These tours illustrate the importance given to both regional governments and 
export-oriented companies. Furthermore, since according to The Economic Observer (2008), 
SMEs had repeatedly turned to ministries for support in the preceding months, those trips were 
most likely at least partially initiated by direct appeals of SMEs. Hence, particular attention has 
been given to the difficulties SMEs face, which is also reflected in governmental official’s 
statements. Wen Jiabao for instance on his trip to Guangdong officially acknowledged the problems 
of exporting SMEs (Xinhua Agency Service, 2008d). Similarly, Li Keqiang’s trip to Zhejiang 
investigated how private enterprises are faring, and as a result from this, he promised to provide 
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support and also be aware of declining exports (Hong Kong Economic Times, 2008b). Wang 
Qishan also immediately gave his support for a tire-producing company that encountered 
difficulties due to foreign exchange settlements (Xinhua Agency Service, 2008b). 
Where does this attention to SMEs come from? The major reason for this support and attention is 
most likely the result of the China Association of Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (CASME). 
When the currency basket was established in 2005, there was no organization in China through 
which SMEs could organize themselves and effectively lobby for their interests. With the 
establishment of CASME in 2006, SMEs gained a better organizing platform. First of all, CASME 
is an important information provider for SMEs. New policies and their relevance for SMEs are 
explained, and important announcements of other ministries such as the MOFCOM or the General 
Administration of Customs are compiled on one comprehensive and extensive webpage, making it 
easy for managers of SMEs to access them. There are also multiple events organized where the 
managements of SMEs can meet and discuss about problems they encounter. Furthermore, several 
lectures per year on various topics, such as energy saving, are sponsored by CASME. Second, 
through CASME, SMEs speak with one voice which increases their bargaining power. According 
to CASME’s web page, CASME is the bridge between government and SMEs (China Association 
of Small and Medium Enterprises, 2014). Representatives of CASME feature prominently in the 
press and express their opinions on the economy clearly. For instance, according to an article by 
Xinhua based on several interviews, the situation for SMEs is very bitter and many enterprises had 
to close in the preceding months. As Sun Xiuchun, secretary general of CASME clearly voiced: “It 
is not a matter of development, but of survival”. In the same article, other respondents to the 
interviews state that the appreciation should stop before it goes too far and that tax relaxing policies 
should be adopted (Xinhua Agency Service, 2008c). While it is not directly indicated that CASME 
representatives met any governmental officials, it is striking that these interviews were published 
on July 15, in the middle of the decision- making process. Thus, the bargaining position of SMEs 
is much better compared to any earlier instance of exchange rate policy making.  
According to Xinhua Agency Service (2008e), business representatives were also present at the 
second round of meetings from July 8-11. However, whereas the opinion of both regional leaders 
and scholars was made public, the opinion of business representatives is unfortunately not 
monitored, nor is it said who has been present in the first place. For all of the following meetings, 
little information is generally given about who exactly has been consulted and which opinion they 
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might have voiced. However, the impact of export-oriented companies in the initial period is highly 
probable. Business representatives personally lead top leadership members through factories and 
explain which problems are most pressing and how they believe the situation could be eased. 
Furthermore, Wang Qishan, secretary general of the CLGFE, gained influence since his 
appointment in early 2008 in economic decision-making and is according to Naughton (2008, p. 8) 
more market-oriented, more devoted to private enterprise promotion and less engaged in easing 
social problems resulting from liberalization than for instance Wen Jiabao. His stance towards 
RMB appreciation is hence very interesting, because he is on the one hand more willing to support 
the private sector but on the other hand also less prone to intervene because of social problems. 
That his willingness to intervene and support the private sector, even though this is in contrast to a 
market-driven economy, increased significantly can be taken as an illustration of how meetings 
with business representatives can influence the mind-set of politicians. In May 2008, Wang Qishan 
still had said that the current course of tight monetary policy is appropriate (Finet News Services 
Limited, 2008), but in July, during his trip to Shandong, he stated that even though tight monetary 
policy still needs to be pursued, there also needs to be a distinction in the treatment of companies, 
and that some require shelter for the current situation but also overall pressure to improve their 
competitiveness (Hong Kong Economic Times, 2008a). This statement offers two interpretations. 
First, it might be that it was the trip itself that convinced him that private companies required 
extensive support. It could however also be the case that Wang reached this position already before 
he went on the inspection tour and used the tour in order to officially acclaim his position. To 
clarify his position shortly before the tour would require interviewing him or someone of his 
entourage. Anyway, SMEs found a powerful ally in Wang Qishan. Since other top economic 
leaders could also be personally convinced on their respective trips to other provinces, it is likely 
that different personal channels to top officials in the end resulted in a comprehensive support 
package directed at SMEs, which ultimately included a pause in RMB appreciation. 
 
The decision-making process in the middle of 2008 is more personalized around top politicians 
than the official procedure would suggest, but at the same time leaves much more space for new 
actors such as representatives of SMEs, non-party representatives and scholars. In contrast to this, 
in 2005, when the currency basket was introduced, these voices had less space and core bodies, 
such as the NDRC or the PBC, had a strong impact on the decision-making process. No particular 
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indication that either PBC, NDRC or MOFCOM featured prominently in the process was found. 
Throughout all the process, export-oriented companies most likely took part in the discussions and 
could bargain for more support. Eventually, without the establishment of CASME, the bargaining 
power of SMEs would have been lower. Instead of appealing to the MOFCOM and hoping for the 
MOFCOM to put forward their interests, as has happened in 2005, albeit unsuccessfully, they 
constitute a better organized entity in 2008 with increased bargaining power. In contrast to the 
analysis of Jiang (2010) and Zeng (2009), this research found considerable suggestive evidence 
that the private business sector developed a better bargaining basis in the years after 2005, resulting 
from both the establishment of CASME and the financial crisis. While it is not possible in this 
research to ultimately prove that the business sector did influence the relevant politicians, it is most 
likely that post-decision bargaining resulting in an alteration of monetary policy and pause in RMB 
appreciation in 2008 had occurred.  
5 Conclusion 
In contrast to the treatment of China as a unitary actor which is common among western scholars 
like Bergsten (2010) and Goldstein and Lardy (2006), this research illustrated how diversified and 
comprehensive economic decision-making in China is. The myth of China as one ruling elite that 
can easily implement any decision without compromising or bargaining involved was demystified. 
Rather than being a coherent unit, China’s economic decision-making process involves a 
considerable amount of bargaining and consensus-building before a final decision is made, and 
monetary policy is a trade-off process rather than an elitist decision. For anyone dealing with China, 
whether scholar, policy maker or business leader, this is an important revelation. In addressing 
issues of dispute, one need to consider many more actors than a few years earlier, and the currency 
issue is by far not as simplistic as the US literature suggests. Overly simplistic arguments are not 
likely to be successful, since they cannot be directed at those who are actually concerned in China. 
Moreover, if those writers wish to successfully move their government to accuse China of currency 
manipulation and take further steps, a more comprehensive look at the reality of the international 
economy and economic interdependence would be required. US MNEs producing in China are for 
instance equally hit by any US decision on how to fare with the currency dispute, and it might 
actually be the case that these MNEs align themselves with Chinese SMEs and try to exert influence 
on the Chinese government, a topic which would require further research. This thesis provided 
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some insights into how complicated, varied and comprehensive the decision-making process is. 
Those involved in the currency dispute should hence pay closer attention to the many different 
actors and interests involved in the process if they wish to negotiate successfully.  
This research established suggestive evidence for the increased influence of business 
representatives on decision-making, but there is plenty of scope for future research. Interviews with 
officials and business representatives would most likely underpin the argument of this thesis and 
offer new revelations. Additionally, the nature of “influence” would still require research. How do 
corruption, favours or the “unwritten” contract that Breslin (2010) suggested relate to the influence 
of the business sector? Furthermore, the emergence of CASME as an organization that represents 
SMEs would be a worthwhile topic for research. Eventually, this research illustrated that the 
Chinese business sector is a lively and increasingly powerful group of domestic actors in China’s 
exchange rate policy.  
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7 Appendix 
7.1 Abbreviations  
Central Leading Group on Finance and 
Economics 
CLGFE 
China Association of Small and Medium 
Enterprises  
CASME 
International Monetary Fund IMF 
Leading Small Groups LSG 
Ministry of Commerce MOFCOM 
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperation 
MOFTEC 
Multinational Enterprise MNE 
National Development and Reform 
Commission 
NDRC 
People’s Bank of China PBC 
Renminbi RMB 
Small and medium enterprise  SME 
World Trade Organization WTO 
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